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This is an essay of two parts. The first part discusses a ‘solution’ to the potential problem of 
the colliding of religious traditions provided by the USA. It is a solution based on manners 
and civility – it is the solution that relies upon the preservation of civility through the 
suppression of dialogue. In this paper I argue that this is a particularly American solution, a 
product of the American form of Calvinism which forms the deep roots of the nation’s 
habits and sentiments.  I then argue that while this solution has been exported in the world 
of ideas much as US movies and consumer items find themselves exported, and much as the 
United States has tried to export liberal democracy to parts of the world that lack any 
habitus upon which such institutions could take root, it will not work in Europe where the 
large influx into Europe of Muslim immigrants over the last fifty years has contributed to a 
volatile political climate in which religion is once again a source of real faction. I conclude 
by arguing that Europeans need to cure their social amnesia and engage in serious dialogue 
with Muslim communities about the future they are building. And this will only be 







In a book I can only describe as breathtaking in its insights, conjectures and 
suggestions John Murray Cuddihy’s No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant 
Taste argued that the United States of America had managed a transition from 
a culture of civil religion to a religion of civility. It is not a work that has any 
obvious philosophical or stylistic affinities with post-structuralism. Yet  his 
conclusion  has as its epitaph Gayatri Chakrvorti’s Spivak’s pithy formulation 
of Derrida’s difference as ‘the structure of perennial postponement which is 
constituted only through postponement.’1 Cuddihy had an uncanny nose for 
the consensuses which had come to dominate American cultural life. And, 
although, he does not say so, the choice of that fronts piece of that chapter is 
one more example of the value of a book that raises far more issues than the 
case studies would suggest. For not only Derrida but the ensemble of post-
ideas and movements coming out of Paris in the 1960s and 1970s would so fit 
the American academic cultural consensus  that French ‘theory’ would 
provide the defining concepts, tropes and programmatic moves for a rising 
generation of  American intellectuals dedicated to transforming the world so 
that all could be members of a ‘more civil society. 
 Of the French/ USA connection of what we might loosely call the ’68 
generation  a little more later, but Cuddihy’s ‘thesis’ is that civility in the 
United States is the replacement of the ‘deep communal solidarity/  ‘a 
solidarity  of the surface and a  solidarity for the interim – an 
Interimssolidarität.’2 This solidarity is not ‘built on the ‘warm, dense closeness 
of “real” solidarity,’ but upon ‘a social variant of “Bourgeois formalism.”’ A 
great transformation has occurred, which is consistent with a fleet of similar 
transformations taking place within modernity – the transformation of the 
more abstract over the real, a transformation of form over content.  Cuddihy 
remains somewhat ambivalent about the scale of this achievement; for it is all 
too obvious that this interim solidarity’, or ‘religion of civility’ and all the 
policies and claims made on its behalf has not succeeded in curbing the oozing 
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ailments of liberal atomism and fragmentation, all too visible, in the scale and 
intensity of the addictions and social afflictions which plague contemporary 
Western societies.  
From his community grounded orientation, Marx had named that process 
alienation, and although Nietzsche eschews any kind of quasi-egalitarian 
notion of Gemeinschaft along Marxian or Rousseauian lines, he is also 
convinced of the coupling between  a process of anti-life, the nihilism of our 
idealizing or Platonizing of reality, and  the horrible potential fate of the West 
- the total triumph of ‘the last man.’  
One of the great virtues in a book full of virtues is Cuddihy’s ambivalence 
about the solution that the West (he really means the United States – but the 
occasional identification of the USA and West has an importance I will pick up 
below) has found for the problem of enmity. For, on the one hand, the triumph 
of civility is a triumph of the deferral of the apocalyptic. And the preceding 
part of the century had demonstrated all too clearly the apocalyptic character 
of the collisions that take place within and between substantive modalities of 
modern solidarity - nations/ imperial alliances/ ideologies. On the other hand, 
it is a triumph of vulgarity and tastelessness, of the sacrifice of intellect and 
taste. And although Cuddihy traces such a lowly aesthetic (the aesthetic  of the 
interim) to the Gospels, he also sees that the extension of Christian charity , in 
what he, following Parsons, calls the ethic of the ‘criss-cross,’ an ethic in which 
irresolvable large scale violent  antithesis become ameliorated through their 
being scaled  down into multi-directional tensions has taken place at the 
expense of the need for more sublime figures, rituals, commitments and 
genuine existential acts of charity.  (Stated thus one must ask was post-
structuralism not a Parsonian riff, a riff in which the ostensibly radical social 
transformations most visible in areas of sexual and gender issues have been 
achieved by a more consistent application of bourgeois formalism?) 
If  the triumph of the criss-cross has its source in American Calvinism, as 
Cuddihy has suggested, and if, as he also demonstrates, that in the earlier part 
of the century leading Evangelical, Catholic and Jewish figures also lent their 





That was the price of each group’s own fundamental conviction that the 
sacred component of its own community – which is to say what was most 
essential within its community -  had to be treated with humility and, if not 
outright disdain, at least  in the context of civil exchange and communication 
with polite reservation and the most decorous requirement of all – silence. If 
decorum is the style of civility, then every failure to observe such civility is 
mere fundamentalism. To use the plain speak of vulgarity:  within the 
mannered society,  the very condition of  a religious community’s substantive 
solidarity, and the faith that glues its members becomes bad taste and 
civilized once it  is expressed in the public arena. Put slightly differently, to 
have the temerity to express one’s most fundamental convictions to someone 
outside of your community  is to be a fundamentalist. And to be a 
fundamentalist is to demonstrate that one is not worthy of being treated 
civilly – for civility requires mutuality of respect. One who does not 
demonstrate civility must be shamed, forced to repent so that one might come 
back within the zone of civil security.  
The rise of the civil goes hand in hand with a certain view of the state as the 
protective artifact powerful enough to ensure the continuity of civility. The 
civil zone requires its members have a source of authority they can appeal to 
against the uncivil, a force strong enough to enforce  a more concordant 
community of divers collectives. That authority is what Hobbes named the 
Leviathan, the monster from the deep strong enough to put an end to what he 
called natural right (the right of forces in collision) whose body, as the 
wonderful etching to the first edition of the work bearing that name so 
perceptively captures, is but the metallic scales of the people themselves. And 
is it not conspicuous that the expansion of the religion of civility and the 
solidarity of the interim has gone hand in hand with the state accruing more 
powers to itself as it increasingly is required to ensure that its members do 
not offend each other? 
Let us step back a second and notice that I have taken Cuddihy’s insights just 
slightly further and slightly backward – further in that I have added just a few 
phrases which are no longer merely American but now part of a more global 





States, which forms the space of Cuddihy’s concerns, to what Hobbes had held 
up as a new idea of the political body in the context of the English  civil war. 
For the fact is that while Cuddihy is, I think, absolutely correct to argue that a 
transformation took place in the United States during the 20th century in 
which a certain variant of Calvinism took hold, Hobbes provides the most 
conspicuously modern legitimation of the absolute sovereignty demanded by 
the modern state. This is irrespective of the fact that Hobbes eschews 
genuinely democratic representative government. It is also the case that the 
Hobbesian solution is  a case of an  English version of Calvinism applied to a 
crisis that Calvinism helped engender.3  It is this Calvinist solution to the 
problem of political conflict – conflict caused, inter alia, by the blowback of the 
crown’s elevation of a new group of power brokers (formed via the 
distribution of the plunder of Church property), and the failure to really 
reform the Church at the right time -  which would be spread globally by the 
Calvinized culture of the United States after the Second World War.    
It is a great irony that the one country that has been so incapable of  solving its 
internal racial problem took on the mantle of instructing Europe in the mores 
of civility after the explosive politics of nations of the First World War had 
reignited and reconfigured itself into the National Socialist politics of race. But 
that instruction was exactly what it did, commencing with the decision to 
provide a legal theatre in Nuremberg (as well as the smaller theatres 
throughout Europe) so that rectitude would become visible in the after math 
of the War and the German people rediscover the moral bearing it had lost.   
With the growth of its universities, as well as the extraordinary talent 
gathered within them with the inpouring of refugees from Nazism, the United 
States (whose tenure policies emphasized publication long before the UK or 
Australia) led the world in the production and distribution of post-World War 
2 social ideas. And the ideas it developed and circulated were ideas about how 
to improve the world, which given the state of the rest of the world, and 
imperial free-fall of Great Britain, could be said to be equivalent to making the 
world more like the USA. Along with rock n’ roll and coca cola, American 
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scholarship, American ideas about politics, society and culture were for 
export.  By the time of Vietnam, the United States would itself find itself being 
criticized by youth all around the world precisely because of the massive 
contradiction between the moral view of life it had successfully spread in a 
world in the ruins and smoke of fascism and the brutality of its imperial 
politics. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the 
United States’ imperial role in the Cold War was ever represented as a moral 
role – and the tension between the pragmatics of its Real Politik and the moral 
rhetoric, however hollow it has been in the hands of some (all?) 
administrations has always blunted its weaponry. For  the moral narrative of 
its global political purpose and role  has always served to fuel internal moral 
dissent from the pragmatics that other superpowers, unencumbered by the 
need not to shoot journalists and to woo an electorate,   simply find baffling.  
But if the United States has been torn between a hegemonic imperial logic, in 
so small part due to the irruptions and vortices of violence that seems to fill 
political vacuums, and a desire to retreat to the relative safety of its  distance 
from the conflicts of the un-Calvinized, due to the moral pressure and outrage 
of its administrations’  internal critics, it nevertheless finds some kind of 
anchorage in the solace of its civic righteousness.   
It might seem that I am speaking ironically, but I am not. For, in its way, the 
United States has to some extent solved  a significant problem – the problem 
of its own internal collective political communalized violence. And it is 
understandable why it should be proud of that solution, even if the society  of 
the United States is not only the most violent of Western liberal democracies 
in terms of crimes committed, but also in terms of how criminals are treated. 
The success is, however, visible in the relationships between religious 
communities in the United States. One cannot, for example, imagine wars 
breaking out in the United States, in which religious designation, even of 
different  Christian groups – as was the case between warring Croats and 
Serbs in the 1990s – becomes a contributing factor in the conflict. And if the 
rest of Europe seems light years away from reproducing the Serbian solution 
to the presence of Muslims in their neighbourhood (a solution which was 





treatment of Serbian enclaves within their midst), the Muslim problem, as it 
may be somewhat un-decorously, termed in Europe  has not reached the same 
scale in the United States as in Europe. And this is in spite of the scale of 
killings of 9.11 far surpassing the Madrid  and the London underground 
bombings, but, in the main, the presence of in Europe has had a far greater 
effect in the day to day political alignments and tensions than in the USA. 
Whether  the United States’ religion of civility is genuinely successful in 
creating a healthy peace between Muslims and non-Muslims is difficult to say. 
And certainly there are journalists and academics in Europe who reproduce 
the ‘no offence/ respects and rights model of the United States. In any case a 
debate held by the Robert Rosenkranz foundation on the question ‘Is Islam a 
religion of Peace?’ in which Hirsi Ali and Douglas Murray argued the negative 
and Zeba Khan and Maajid Nawaz the affirmative was a very powerful 
illustration of how the religion of civility model of tolerating difference rests 
upon stealthily (though not necessarily consciously) depleting the most 
dangerous and vital elements which are the glue of the substantive solidarity 
of non-Calvinized peoples.4 For what was so striking about the affirmative 
case and appeals of Zeba Khan and Maajid Nawaz was how unquestionably 
liberal their rendition of Islam was. Both accepted without qualification the 
separation between religion and politics, and in a way that was completely 
commensurate with the public/ private split and the accompanying relegation 
of  religion to the private individual. It was an exercise in  the classical appeals 
of liberalism. The un-scarved Zeba Khan spoke movingly of her loving parents 
whose civility and tolerance undoubtedly would find few equals, let alone 
peers, within the audience. For as Zeba Khan recounted: 
they enrolled me and my siblings in a Hebrew day school for nine years, 
where we learned Hebrew, read the Torah, and prayed in a synagogue almost 
every morning. They always wanted us to learn about other faiths, and they 
always made sure that we knew the difference, though, between Islam and 
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Judaism. But they also made sure we also respected our Jewish sisters and 
brothers in faith.5  
Khan’s parents were as she emphasized throughout first and foremost liberal 
American(ized) Muslims, though every sentence and every gesture was meant 
to reach out to her fellow Americans in the audience, she seemed oblivious to 
the fact that to more traditional Muslims what she was saying was utterly 
shocking. Who can imagine pious Muslims from anywhere from Pakistan/ 
Iran/ Saudi Arabia/ to Egypt being warmly congratulated by fellow Shia or 
Sunnis for sending their children to Hebrew school to learn what the Koran 
makes very explicit is  an apostatic treatise from an apostatic people?  But 
Khan was not thinking of an audience outside of her comfort zone. And from 
inside it - who could doubt that Zeba Khan’s parents were people of peace? 
Certainly not Hirsi Ali, who must retain a retinue of body guards to protect her 
from Muslims threatening to kill her, nor Douglas Murray, both of whom made 
a point of their admiration for Khan and Nawaz as people. What remained of 
Khan’s parents’ Islam, in the story she told, was a certain kind of faith – an 
anodyne faith in which goodness and niceness and tolerance were all too  
conspicuous, and in which anything resembling the kinds of Muslim 
communities actually existing in the Muslim world have little to no 
counterpart. Were they to exist there, the Israel problem would have ceased 
decades back; Muslim anti-Semitism would have vanished; jihad would not be 
exported; all women would have equal rights with men; anti-Semitism would 
be the exception rather than the rule; and Christian evangelists could openly 
seek to convert Muslims. We might say, Islam would just be another religion, 
and it would be, as Christianity and Judaism now are (but were not, of course, 
always), a liberal one.  
The other party to the affirmative position of the debate Maajid Nawaz was, if 
anything, and if possible, even more liberalized, or at the very least his talk 
was based upon a more sophisticated liberal theoretical framework. Nawaz’s 
journey to being a founding member of the Quilliam Foundation, an anti-
terrorist Islamic think tank, had been an interesting one. A British born 
Muslim with Pakistani parents, as a university student  he joined Hizb ut-
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Tahrir,  a party widely active in universities in the United Kingdom, but 
banned in less enlightened countries such as Russia, and in a large number of 
Muslim countries, including Syria, Turkey and Bangladesh, and Egypt, where 
he was imprisoned for his activities with Hizb ut-Tahrir. He was adopted as a  
prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International – even though Hizb ut-
Tahrir’s mission of a return to the caliphate and the replication of 
Mohammad’s foundation of an Islamic state hardly seems commensurate with 
a genuine politics of non-violence; for whatever one may think of Mohammad 
there is no question that he and his community were engaging in strategic 
warfare of survival and expansion. According to Nawaz he learnt from the 
example of older Muslims during his time in prison in Egypt  that his brand of 
Islamism was contrary to genuine Islam, and was more a branch of fascism 
than Islam. The story is certainly moving, but it is curious that he could for so 
long misinterpret the peaceful narrative he would later find in the Koran. It is 
equally interesting that in the debate he would make a critical distinction 
between Islamic scholars and the fact that many of the Islamist ‘extremists’ 
were not ‘clerics’.  Though, he did concede that the Ayatollah Khomeini was a 
scholar, which raises the question: how complex is the liberal message if a 
man who spends his life studying the Koran, hadith and legal traditions fails to 
see it? And Nawaz was being extremely disingenuous in giving the impression 
that his ‘scholars’ were somehow the more orthodox interpreters of Islam.  
But for me the most interesting appeal of Nawaz was the appeal to historical 
context and the changing times. Nawaz spoke as if historical progress is the 
most natural thing in the world, and as if all people’s assemble their temporal 
experience in  such a way as to learn from their past in order to  live more 
morally now. Thus, when confronted by Douglas Murray about the age of 
Aisha when Mohammad ‘married her’ (six) and, in Murray’s words ‘raped’ her 
(nine),  Nawaz emphasized the need to take into account the historical context 
of the morality of the period. Indeed, the insistence upon a historical 
hermeneutic was critical to Nawaz’s major argument. In another environment, 
Nawaz might have been forced to confront the fact that such a historical 
hermeneutic and such a view of historical progress has nothing to do with the 





There is nothing terribly difficult about that hermeneutics – it is one that 
depicts God word as all powerful, all embracing, and as ever true. It is a 
perspective that goes against the grain of modernity, but it is not one that 
contradicts traditional tribal or imperial ways of understanding authority. On 
the contrary it is a brilliantly successful way of consolidating and heightening 
the degree and intensity of a traditional  understanding of authority within  a 
larger framework of communal solidarity. It stabilizes and anchors – God is 
but God, there is one book, and one life worthy of being depicted within a 
book of his saying and deeds. If possible all other contingencies should be 
understood through that powerful unity of divinity, of law and society, and 
example. Nawaz’ hermeneutics might seem like common sense, but they 
nothing in common with the sense that  operates within the larger Muslim 
world.  
Nawaz’s contextualist perspective relativizes the word of Allah, just as it 
absolutizes the view of progress whose roots are the providentialist ones of 
Christianity, which would undergo a secular transmogrification in the, 
frequently, more facile versions of the Enlightenment. But even the need to 
find historical hermeneutical methods for the reading of scripture – as is all 
too conspicuous in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, comes out of 
more than a century of religious wars within the Christian nations.   
Stated more bluntly Nawaz and Khan like many millions of Muslims find 
themselves in a world whose reproduction has been shaped by narratives 
based on experiences exogenous to the sacred texts which form that part of 
their identity which they might well think is their most important part. To 
some extent, this split between the forces of reproduction and the historical 
sources of everyday appeal is the case of everyone who appeals to some    
ultimate authority to orientate their being. And this lengthy discussion of the 
one side of the debate has not been for the purpose of seeing who wins the 
debate. Although, it is noteworthy that the idea of the value of peace as such as 
the absolute source of appeal of a religion’s worth tells us equally about the 
kind of world we inhabit and the narratives that are constitutive of at least 
that part of it which is inhabited by the participants in the debate and their 





autobiographical narrative of Hirsi Ali and the political challenges and 
uncomfortable facts of Douglas Murray than by the good will and natures of 
Nawaz and Khan; they lost the debate - 55 % to 36 %, even though prior to the 
debate the audience were more sympathetic to the affirmative than the 
negative – by 41% to 25%). The lesson that Nawaz and Khan must have taken 
away is that more must be done by Muslims to convince North Americans that 
Islam is a religion of peace. Another way of saying this is that more must be 
done to redress the perception of incivility that the US has of Islam, though the 
most obvious way this must be done is through the kind of deeds that Nawaz 
himself is doing. Which is to say more must be done to make Muslims more 
civil. Or if I go back to my earlier point – more must be done to Calvinize 
Muslims.  
I should also note here that Nawaz is actually a British citizen of Pakistani 
parents, and that Hizb ut-Tahrir, the organization he left, has only become 
active in the United States in the last few years. But it is interesting that a 
former radical Muslim from Britain has come to the United States to preach 
that Islam is a peaceful religion and he finds himself competing with his 
former organization about the direction of Islam. He is a good example of the 
successful export of Calvinism.  
But let me return to my earlier disjuncture between the United States and 
Europe, and my claim about the civilizing mission of the United States, and the 
Calvinism which is at its civic heart. I must add that this consensus of civility is 
not one that runs through the entire culture or across classes – it is the 
consensus of the reflexive consciousness and the class who fabricates that 
consciousness and thus shapes the reflexive sites, the educative institutions of 
the nation.  
Almost no greater criticism can be made of something  a speaker says in the 
United States than the retort ‘I am greatly offended by what you are saying.’ A 
phrase that loses any kind of forcefulness once it moves into Catholic or  
Orthodox Europe. It is no accident that in the United States words take on 
such a delicate nature – if used offensively they are to the civil consensus like 





anyone who uses an offensive word must be shamed. An English  radio 
journalist I  met once told me how she was looked upon with the horror 
usually reserved for the worst social lepers when she jokingly responded to a 
story about ladies underwear being kept in refrigerated storage to preserve 
the traces of semen: ‘you mean that’s a  fridge full of knickers.’ To the 
American ear the harshness of the English ck threatened to open up a race 
riot. And the story, in 1999, of David Howard having to resign after having 
used the word niggardly (and Wikipedia lists a number of incidents where this 
word has led to uproar) indicates how dangerous  the penumbra of offense 
may be within the United States – so charged is the subject that it provides the 
material for  one of the finest literary works to appear in the USA of the last 
fifty years – Phillip Roth’s The Human Stain.6    
 For all its madness though  I have suggested that the United States has 
been somewhat successful in solving the problem of religious violence. Even 
though the number of deaths from 9.11 far exceeded the deaths caused by 
Islamism in Europe, there is no mainstream anti-Muslim/ anti-immigration 
party in the United States. In part this is because Islam is not seen as Islam in 
the United States – it is seen as a minority religion.7 Which brings us to the 
core defect of the culture of no offense – that nothing is seen for what it is. The 
great culture of the toleration of difference is really a culture of the 
intolerance of difference. This is, of course, what the great intolerants – the 
American conservatives (who have no real European counterpart) always say; 
though what they don’t realize is that this is precisely the American way, that 
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this is due not to the defeat of Christianity but to its triumph. At least to the 
triumph of its form.     
I said earlier that after the Second World War the United States wanted to 
export its mores around the world. And that this was as much a part of its 
rebuilding of Europe as the Marshall Plan. Indeed, one might add that the 
student revolutions that took place around the world in 1968 were the result 
of the success of that strategy. And what has since become the bane of the 
conservative mind - political correctness – is but the institutional 
consolidation of Calvinism, and not as Alan Bloom and so many others have 
thought the triumph of nihilism. The United States might be anarchic in many 
ways, but its educated classes are the least nihilistic on the planet.  
In sum, then, the United States may have its puritan, politically correct 
institutions as the palliative to, what to Europeans looks like its anarchic 
economy and pockets of lawless outsiders (which all find reflection in US 
television series of criminals, polygamists, motorcycle clubs,  prisoners etc.), 
but compared to Europe it has ‘ solved’– at least for now – the problem that 
plagued Europe for so long, and which as we have suggested persisted until 
the mid 1990s and still is not solved.  I must italicize the word solved in the 
case of the United States for the simple reason that its ‘solution’  is one which 
bypasses addressing the real problem – and quite possibly the United States is 
successful enough at least for those who stay out of prison and out the sizable 
pockets of despairing poverty that  it does not need to solve the problem 
internally. But when it comes to Islam the fact is that demographics also seem 
to favour the environment and thus not to place undue pressure on the US 
model of civility. For while there are no official government statistics on 
Muslims in the USA, guestimates would all place the number of Muslims in 
USA far below numbers in those Western European countries where Islam is 
frequently discussed as a ‘a problem’ of demographics. 
Unfortunately though for the United States it has learnt that its bouts of 
isolationism always become interrupted by events which pull it from its 
slumber. And then it equally has the experience (though I will not say that it 





not akin to it. It learns that there is a world beyond American Calvinism, and it 
is unsure of how to operate in that world. It is not helped in its cause by the 
anarchic elements who damage any credibility it may have as a moral force 
and it is also not helped by the fact that its moral narrative conceals the 
violence inherent in  its own rectitude. The United States might lecture the 
world about rights, but every dictatorship has a fair idea of American murder 
statistics, of a society that has been (and in many ways still is) indifferent to 
the lack of health services for its substantial poor, of its racial divisions, of its 
guns, its prisons – which are so important to its sense of order, but are also 
the greatest of breedings ground for racial tensions and for recruiting whites 
into neo-Nazism and blacks into Islam.  
By contrast Europe is a society where substantive solidarity has never been 
completely sacrificed for formal solidarity. And this is also why when 
immigrant communities entered Europe for work, their experience was not 
akin to the American story where immigrant neighbourhoods would be built 
only to then be dispersed into the capillaries of the social body (of course the 
native Americans, and African have also not fitted the model of social 
dispersement).  In Europe unionized labour did not particularly help their 
cause– for in spite of Marxian narratives about class solidarity overriding all 
else, tribalism is one of the most natural modalities of human association, and 
where scarcity prevails tribalism is always conspicuous.8 
 In Europe identity is not something which readily dissolves – even if that is 
what the European Union would like – because, unlike the United States, there 
is no greater culture into which it can dissolve. Europe is not so much an 
actual culture. Under the catholic Church  talk of (Western) European culture 
made far more sense than today – for there were common rituals, festivities, 
an educated lingua franca that did not favour one ethnic group above another. 
Indeed, there is a very good reason that the Romantic view of culture which 
emphasizes language, ethnicity, fairy tales, heroes and the like did not exist 
prior to the Reformation: because there was no real European culture. 
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European culture is something that a small group of (originally Romantic) 
intellectuals wanted to create. Pre-Reformation Christian culture, by contrast, 
was something actual – so actual that some Romantics like Friedrich Schlegel 
and Novalis dreamed, nostalgically, of its reestablishment. Once religion and 
national identity became increasingly allied, Europe’s ethnic and linguistic 
diversity became obstacles to the creation of a common culture of Europe. The 
idea of post-Christian Europe – as opposed to the reality of a united European 
army of diverse principalities  united in their faith against the common enemy 
of Mohammad II that led Pope  Pius II to write his Europa - has only had any 
institutional form for fifty years; and although that form has gathered 
momentum since the end of the Cold War, it is – as the Euro Zone crisis 
happening now illustrates – still fragile.  Europe is a tapestry of neighbours 
whose  historical memories have been formed by recent traumas.  Thus when 
Yugoslavia fell, old murderous memories opened up, or, more recently, when 
Germany appeared heavy handed in its demands for the Greeks to get their 
budgets in order, the swastikas appeared again as a form of political 
embittered political reaction.  
Religious differences in Europe are not, then, differences which can be 
concealed – for Europe is plagued by its panoply of visible signs of  difference  
- its languages, its parliaments, its customs, its three Christian religions (not to 
mention Islam in Albania, Bosnia and Turkey and the Muslim remnants of 
former Ottoman occupied states) which all speak of contrary historical 
narratives visible in architecture and artifacts as much as habits and 
sentiments.  Likewise when immigrants enter Europe they are surrounded by 
differences which yell at them. To the American mind the magnitude of these 
differences is all too easily underplayed, as if a liberal resolution were simply 
a matter of good will. A good example of how this was aired in an op ed for Al 
Jaezeera by Joanathan Laurence, an Associate Professor of Political Science at 
Boston College.9 The essence of the essay is compactly put in the title – 
‘Europe’s failure to integrate Muslims.’ According to Laurence  the failure 
comes from the restriction placed upon Muslims to symbolically express their 
identity in the public sphere. He operates under the delusion that what 
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Americans and even European intellectuals (who reproduce Hannah Arendt’s 
political appreciation of the political modalities springing from the American 
Revolution) call public-space exists in European countries. European political 
life is much more the product of the nation than the public – and as nations 
are in far greater disarray in much of Europe than any time since the last War 
– the question of commitment to the nation has reappeared with ever greater 
frequency in ways that Eurocrats had thought was no longer possible. Apart 
from the broader tension between nation and public, Laurence’s essay does 
not  address, at least with any seriousness (for there is a polemical put down 
of the idea),  the all-important fact that one of the great complaints of 
secularists in Turkey, and secular ‘Muslim’ women living in Muslim ghettoes/ 
neighbourhoods in other parts of Europe, is the intense pressure of 
conformity that comes from the Islamic community. Thus women who do not 
want to veil up in certain Muslim in Turkey or Muslim dominated suburbs in 
France have had to veil up or be punished.10 The pressure of conformity is not  
a particularly Muslim   trait – it is a condition of all communities – but this 
does not eradicate the fact that there can be very severe consequences for 
women who do want to conform to the mores of their tradition once they have 
been exposed to and offered the possibility of change. 
 Laurence, like Khan and Nawaz, seem to take the matter of freedom of choice 
for granted. The freedom of choice that has emerged in the liberal parts of the 
world is a fruit whose sacrificial  costs were enormous. And the fact that the 
greatest price was paid for centuries ago should not fool us into thinking that 
the experience of choice is effortless. Nor that it is even desirable in itself. The 
Muslim traditionalist who sees the horror of freedom of choice is not wrong; 
for the cost of freedom of choice is not only paid for in the past - it is paid for 
continuously. More - it is still paid for every time a bad choice is made. 
Freedom means renouncing authority and tradition. It also means being an 
example for others to follow. Freedom is destabilizing within a community. 
And it is very understandable why those whose sense of self is built around 
honour and tradition stop at  nothing including killing one’s own family 
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members to stop the plague of freedom. A widely publicized image of 
demonstrating Islamists has two placards that both seem unimaginable to the 
Western mind: ‘Massacre those who Insult Islam’ and ‘Freedom go to hell.’11 
Honour killings are a terrible example of the collision of worlds – a tragedy 
that comes from different value orders coexisting in the same location - a 
young woman wanting a freedom  that other family members view as 
destructive of all they hold sacred. It is a communal tragedy that was not 
peculiar to Islam, but increasingly so in Europe today it is a peculiarly Muslim 
crime, which (to Europeans a disturbing number of) Muslims do not see as a 
crime.12  The perpetrators of an honour killing believe not only  that they have 
not committed a real crime but they have prevented a crime – they have 
followed a higher law than the mere law of the land.  
Although honour killing occurs in the United States, it tends not to be so 
widely discussed as a particular phenomenon of particular religious group as 
distinct from murder generally. In other words the matter of the sacral nature 
of the deed is bypassed. In Europe too governments wish  conflicts involving 
the sacred would not happen and could just be classified differently. But the 
failure to achieve this is visible in the rise of political parties which refuse to 
accept the kind of institutional consensus which rules in the United States.  
Multi-culturalism is Europe’s  equivalent to the religion of civility. But, when 
the German chancellor Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy recently expressed 
that it was a failed policy they may have been wanting to make political 
capital, both were simply stating what had been a fact for a while in Europe. It 
was not simply that multiculturalism was almost dead, but that it was its 
inability to deal with Islam that had killed off the project.   Given the structure 
of Islam it is astonishing that European governments were so ignorant that 
they thought they could find community leaders who would bring  their 
respective constituents into line so that politicians could find the neat 
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alignments which would conform to the input/ output structural block of 
interest systems of politics that characterizes modern Western party politics. 
Indeed the example of multi-culturalism and Islam in European is an 
interesting indication of the desperate need to make something with a very 
different shape of human energies and practices try and be moulded into a 
prefabricated Western shape. For Islam was not on few minds when 
multiculturalism was first touted in Europe as a way to manage immigrants 
within the community – and a number of parties encouraged migration to 
enhance their political base.13 Nevertheless, when the UK introduced its ‘Life 
in the United Kingdom Tests’ in 2005 it was belated and some might say 
rather innocuous attempt to try and find some social glue by trying to define 
and instruct new migrants in British values. The real problem, so evident in 
the 2011 riots (which had nothing whatever to do with Islam) is that an 
increasing number of European nations, including Britain, do not seem to have 
many core values anymore. 
Equally, indicative of the collision between not only multi-culturalism, but far 
more disconcertingly, human rights and the European response to Islam is the 
recent wave of parliamentary attempts throughout Europe to ban the niqab, 
beginning in 2009 with Belgium, and now legislation has been passed or is at 
various forms of progress in Switzerland (coming on the heels of the minaret 
bans), Italy, the Netherlands and France. I think what is important here is that 
these nations are not wanting to do away with rights per se, not wanting to do 
away with liberal democratic political mechanisms. Yet they find themselves 
in water with no better solution than the might of Leviathan.   
Yet it is also important to note that liberal democracies in Europe are under 
other pressures besides Islam which eat away at their durability – not least 
are the budgetary pressures, and generational conflicts as the elderly want 
their pensions, and the young have to pay for their education. And while the 
relative closure of the labor market protects the jobs of those employed, as we 
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indicated above, the young and the immigrants remain condemned to be part 
of what Marx  had called the reserve army of the unemployed. And the fact 
that Marx remains correct about capitalism’s periodic crisis but wrong about a 
solution to the problem does not make the crisis any less of a crisis.  
Europe is in a deeper set of crises than at any time since the defeat of fascism. 
Islam is not the source of its despair, but is one further symptom of its despair, 
as are the wave of anti-immigration parties, and, not surprisingly, this in turn 
has its corollary in young Muslims taking on more radical political 
interpretations of Islam than their parents generally did. In both instances, 
such responses tend more to fuel rivenness that already is conspicuous 
between the urban tertiary educated, and the non-tertiary educated  lower 
classes – the former generally being more radicalized. At the same  time, such 
suppressions of traditional liberal freedoms – suppression which seem to go 
against the entire thrust of liberalization occurring in other aspects of life (gay 
marriage, for example) have also fueled anti-immigration political parties 
whose arguments against Islam are traditional liberal ones.  
In its despair a number of countries in  Europe has tried to use hate speech 
legislation.  Hate speech legislation has two sources of origin in Europe: anti-
Semitism/ holocaust denial and Islamophobia. Significantly, hate speech 
legislation in the USA is unconstitutional, even though there are arguments 
made by liberal intellectuals to introduce such legislation. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, in the university system in the United States hate speech legislation 
is practiced de facto.  The idea of the holocaust as the paradigmatic  
representation of fascism and hence the ultimate threat to liberal freedoms 
lingers in hate speech legislation which may be invoked by any minority 
group. The point to notice here is the basis of European law is also rights’ 
based and that rights are constructed in the blind/ liberal sense as applicable 
to a minority and thus as needing protection in need of minority status- that 
persecution of gays and Muslims share a common suffix is most revealing 
about the construction of the ‘problem.’ 
Nevertheless, in Europe it is very contentious whether  the use of hate speech 





much to the increasing support for anti-immigration parties as anything. The 
case of the film Fitna has been instructive. Geert Wilders’ short film consisted 
of nothing but news bites, quotations from the Koran, and  Mullahs calling for 
extermination. He was accused of hate speech (but not convicted), but the 
speech he cited was not his own. A similar affair occurred in the United 
Kingdom – a  channel 4 documentary was made some years ago in which 
various radical Imams  living in England were recorded calling for violence. 
Although it did not go to court, the  producer of the documentary was 
threatened with court action by the police for inciting racial hatred.  These are 
not simply examples which revolve around Islam, but they are examples of 
fractious issues feeding into a deep sense of alienation and abstractness, a 
hiatus between law and common sense, the danger of which is that it erodes 
the one thing that every society grounded in the rule of law most requires, viz. 
faith that law is just. Law itself is jeopardized when it is synonymous with an 
identifiably  political point view that belies common sense. Indeed it 
illustrates that there is no longer a common sense within a community, as 
legislators and policy makers part company with larger sections of the 
‘nation’. 
To say that the religious problems now existing in Europe were of Europe’s 
own making is to state the obvious. But as in all things people do not know the 
future they are making at the time of the making. They always think it is 
something else. The failure to understand human needs, and the idea that 
economic satisfaction was all a human being needed was so prevalent that 
when immigrants from countries with vastly different religious traditions 
came into Europe there was no concern about what effects this would have 
generations down the track. Then the quick fix of multiculturalism was 
adopted.  
Then and now interfaith dialogue has also been adopted. But this too has 
largely followed the United States Calvinist model of ‘no offense’ – as the 
emphasis upon religious similarities is at the core of the discussion, when, in 
fact, such a process largely involves a substitute racket of all religions with a 
pseudo-religion (embraced enthusiastically I a completely different context by 





of the United States the content of perennial philosophy is substantive – it is 
mysticism. The trouble with mysticism, though, is that it only appeals to 
mystics, and they are always a rather small component of the religious body. 
Interfaith dialogue tends to supplement the idea of a religious/ mystic core 
with an appreciation of ritual in conjunction with ethics. But such approaches 
ultimately only appeal to a far narrower group of people – people who 
appreciate abstractions – than the divers substantive sacral codes  which 
provide orientation through the thickets of everyday life.  
Without wishing to overly valorize Carl Schmitt, it is true that enmity is not an 
aberration within the human experience but intrinsic to it. And the religious 
and political experiences of Europe  are all testaments to what has been built 
out of inimical relationships. The question then is not how can we tip toe 
around each other so that inimical relationships will not break out – but how 
is it possible to build bridges so as to form alliances in spite of the fact that we 
are in conflict about how we are building the world. There are two aspects to 
this: first we do not hide the fact that faith is not a private thing. It is not 
merely the mystical, but it is at the core of a community’s actions. A 
community’s core directs actions so that the group forms its future on the 
basis of selected/ cultivated/ shaped human traits, and behaviours.  The 
sacred core must be spoken if it is to be lived. It must be preached and it must 
be preserved. Every community’s future  is indeed endangered by every other 
community which seeks to form a different future. There are European 
liberals, like their United States counterparts, who wish this were not the case 
– but in Europe failure to grasp this and work with it is disastrous.  Secondly 
in spite of our different hopes for the future, we are in a common world. And 
that world in all its complexity is woven by many many strands, religion is a 
huge one, but it is but one. Europe’s religious wars were rarely just religious. 
As in life, religion was invariably one element in conflicts. Thus, for example, 
although the Thirty Years undoubtedly had much to do with the Holy Roman 
Empire, the grievances of Protestant subjects, disputes over property that had 
been taken by anti-Catholic secular powers and then repossessed, one can 
make as little sense of the changing political alliances by assuming that those 





understand Ottoman/Christian relations. Indeed what is true today of geo-
politics today was no less true half a millennium ago – that territorial and 
political alliances often completely ignore commonality of religious 
conviction. Thus does the United States today ally itself tightly with Saudi 
Arabia (who solves its internal radical Islamist problem by exporting jihadists 
attacking American interests).  And in Europe’s past there were Ottoman/ 
Christian alliances  such as the alliance of Francis 1 and Suleiman the 
magnificent commencing in 1536, and that between Muslim armies and the 
Dutch and English in the 16th century.  That is to say religion is not the world – 
it is one more part of the world, and that is so irrespective of whether one has 
a theocratic state as in Iran today or for protracted periods within 
Christendom.  
The question is how is the reality of our lives and the multiple appeals, calls 
and pulls upon the powers  which constitute us commensurate with diverse 
communal sacred codes which  ultimately provide the framework for those 
other appeals?  
Here we must take account of many truths which are simply part of  the 
experiential conditions within which any dialogue is possible. Any although I 
think Habermas’ concept of communicative action somewhat simplified the 
nature of dialogue by a kind of Popperian and Kantian hybrid in which 
participants were presented as working toward a common social goal in a 
rather thick sense, it is true that dialogue does require certain conditions for it 
to work. The most elementary is that one is prepared to respond in kind – to 
respond to a word with a word. This itself is problematic enough in the 
context of Islam and Western discourse. For there are all too many examples 
of violence not only being the form of response to words or signs (cartoons) 
that are offensive, but frequent examples of the fear of violent retaliation 
ensuring that books are not published. In this respect, though, a cleavage runs 
through communities which can be seen as cracking up hermetically sealed  
sacred codes in order to let something else transpire between peoples. The 






Historically the world is full of examples of those who are unwilling not to  
talk. It is also full of discarded sacred codes, and individuals and collectives 
who have discarded codes. Moreover every conversation about conflicting 
accounts of the sacred is also a potential threat to one’s commitment to a code 
and at its most extreme even to the code itself. Those who do not wish to 
dialogue, then, are those who do not wish any way to change fundamentally in 
relationship to the code or to change the fundamentals of the code.  
The use of the term fundamentalism or fundamentalist as  a pejorative term  
tells us much about those who use the term – for it points to a preparedness 
on their part to let the fundamentals of the code stand or fall. It is a term that 
already presupposes a liberal context. Thus it is all too understandable why 
not everybody simply changes their behavior and reacts by dropping the 
fundamentals of their code. But being understandable does not mean a 
practice does not have a self-destructive component. And that people commit 
collective suicide for their beliefs is no less a part of having sacred  beliefs 
than living better because of them. 
A self does not exist outside of a world.  And a sacred code is not merely an 
inner code it is  a code that makes peoples and thus the world. But because the 
world is not just made by one sacred code and because the world today is so 
interpenetrated by a variety of codes, imperatives, appeals, laws, rules, 
agreements, adaptations and compromises,  potencies – a vast gamut of 
practices from such a variety of historical sources and journeys to try  and 
limit one’s appeal in a singular manner is totally Quixotic. This does not stop 
people trying – but just as we are forced to create a cleavage between those 
who are prepared to speak and those who are not, we a cleavage – also cross 
cultural/ cross historical, and across faiths etc. exists  between  those who 
refuse to acknowledge the multiplicity and complexity of potential appeals 
(which does not mean they do not make them without taking cognizance of 
what they are doing) and those who take cognizance of what they are doing.  
Here I wish to conclude by pulling the most important themes together, and 
make some proposals. First, Europe cannot ignore the fact that Islam is in its 





and subset of traditions. Third, Europeans are as deeply ignorant of their own 
traditions as they are of Islamic traditions. Fourth, the fundamental ignorance 
of European traditions is, in part, due to internal critiques that have been 
taking place in Europe with the rise in power of the 68 generation. That 
generation projected its concerns so much onto history that it did not 
comprehend the deeper currents of Europe other than as quasi-fascist ones. 
This has been disastrous and it has played into the hands of the enemies of 
liberal democracies, including Islamist ones. The ‘Life in the United Kingdom’ 
criterion is both simplistic and symptomatic of  the problem. The problem of 
the conflict of values between Islam and post-Christian Europe is that too few 
European educators, politicians, and citizens have any idea of their own social 
memory beyond the second World War. Before Europeans begin educating 
migrants about Europe they need to be educated themselves – to understand 
the religious roots of their heritage, the transformations that have taken place, 
and the broader  values that set them apart from other peoples’ histories. At 
the same time, there is a need to understand how European history is 
solidified in global processes and institutions from capital to nation states to 
international law to ecumenical dialogue. Europe’s power in the world as the 
most inventive of all peoples (a truth that one is not supposed to say) did not 
come from goodness or brilliance but from the regularity and enormous scale 
of its conflicts that were fortuitously grafted onto a messianic understanding 
of time and human possibility. Those crises helped trigger off inventive 
responses the likes of which had never before been seen on earth: the 
responses were technological, scientific, commercial, administrative, legal, 
political, and ultimately religious as well – or let us say tempering of religion. 
One might say this in the forgotten European language of theology: Europe’s 
blessing came from grace; its providence came from that grace being 
bestowed on sinners.  
One  great difference between Muslims and Europeans is that the former 
know who they are much better than Europeans who they are. This is 
alarming, and it is the really alarming message that one should take away 
from works such as Bawer’s While Europe Slept. One problem that is deep 





(the divided self was a term Hegel had used to depict the pathology of his own 
age.) That cleavage has the different divisions of the self looking in antithetical  
directions: one looks back nostalgically. It is the European Romantic, and even 
when it looks at its own heritage through a romantic  lens it looks at 
something that cannot be retrieved. Generally, though, the modern European 
Romantic likes to be enchanted by what it cannot have. Islam is partly a gift to 
the Romantic consciousness, but only when it remains unconnected with its 
more virile and politicized energies. Not surprisingly though Romanticism 
also becomes a weapon in a war against Islam such as was illustrated by 
Anders Breivik’s fantasies and crusaders’ costumes, and adverts of the Lega 
Nord also in crusaders’ costume.  
The other pole, which dominated so much of the social and political 
transformations of the last forty years is the utopian consciousness. That is 
the self looking at the future with no concern for the past except to smash it.  
Both Romanticism and Utopianism are disorientating – indeed one may say 
their very existence is a symptom of what Eric Voegelin, following Schelling, 
calls pneuma-pathologies, spiritual diseases.  
Islam by comparison involves a deeply grounded traditionalist approach to 
reality. Its presence in Europe forces Europeans to know their traditions, not 
least their traditional interactions with Muslims. But that is what needs to be 
known for dialogue to being.  
The Calvinism of the United States is basically integration by stealth, which 
requires casting off traditions, because traditions do pull us back in different 
directions and push us into different futures. Living traditions become 
chloroformed as taxideterminists prepare them so they can be safely 
displayed in museums. In Museums traditions coexist much like they do in 
Night at the Museum – only when the doors are closed and everyone is asleep 
do they take on life anymore.  
The United States has had one civil war, but Europe’s twentieth century was 
one of civil war - in three movements; it has been forced to bring its 





invention of parliaments and parties belonged to its earlier institutional 
inventiveness. The genius of politics through parliament and parties is that it 
has the potential to ameliorate discord, but the rise of fascism showed all too 
clearly how fragile this artifice is.  Europe’s traditions are threatened by many 
forces. Islam is not at all the most dangerous, but it is potentially dangerous 
enough if the rest of European society does not see that it must try and 
understand Islam, while at the same time it must know what it stands to lose if 
it surrenders the freedoms, including freedom of conscience and association 
(something that is contrary to the laws against apostates that are intrinsic to 
traditional Islam)  that has given it is flexibility and inventiveness, and its 
tolerance. It is now Europe’s challenge to become friends with the Muslims 
not only in its midst but in the world at large – for the world has long passed 
the possibility of islolationism. But becoming friends first of all requires 
seeing the differences that must be bridged to achieve that. 
